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The Concept of Integration 
Introduction 
The concept of integration is being attached to very many different social phenomena and 
processes. One may point to the common habit of delimiting it in relation to different 
societal sectors: one might talk about economi.c, political, social, and cultural integration. 
But one might also use other distinctions such as institutional, nonnative, and structural 
integration! . 
As a very preliminary delimitation of 'integration' within the social sciences2 one 
could use a traditional dictionary definition: 'to amalgamate or unite parts so that they 
become a new whole '. Earlier autonomous units are linked to each other, e.g. new 
relations are established between them. And furthermore a new unit - a new system - is 
created or emerges, having the other units as subsystems. In some contexts, integration 
implies that the earlier independent units or subsystems do not disappear or are dissolved. 
F or example, within anthropology and sociology integration is often contrasted to 
'assimilation', when used in relation to the incorporation of ethnic groups in a society. In 
this context assimilation denotes the end of the etlmic group as a cultural unit with its own 
identity. In other contexts, as for example in the case of political integration, there seems 
to be no logical need to exclude an end-result of the integration processes in the form of 
a unitary state, but in 'practice' and within the perspective of European integration, the 
same feature remains: the earlier political units do not disappear or are dissolved. But, 
anyhow, starting from this very vague and general delimitation there seems to be a risk 
that the term 'integration' will 'disintegrate ' as it is applied to very different social 
phenomena and different scientific contexts. 
Integration as Common Institutions 
In spite of the diversity of usages of the concept of integration, it may be possible to 
delimit some aspects which seem to be general and also of importance in understanding 
the diversity of usage. Let us start with a distinction between integration and interdepen-
dence . Integration means something more than just a certain level of interactions or 
Within analyses of social integration three aspects or dimension are often singled out: Personal, Relational 
and Structural integration. 
We do not wish to include other scientific areas such as mathematics or technical sciences, where the concept 
of! integration' also is used. 
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transactions. And this 'more' can be expressed in tenns of some common framework or 
common institutions. Thus, in our tenninology raising trade levels or levels of direct 
investments do not in themselves mean a higher level of integration. Political integration 
includes the establishment of common political institutions, economic integration the 
establishment of cornmon economic institutions, etc. By common political institutions we 
mean both fonnal, organized institutions such as a parliament or a governmental 
arrangement - on European level, the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers -
and the evolvement of infonnal routines and expectations such as the regular exchange 
of infonnation between the foreign offices of the capitals of western Europe before the 
launch oflarger policy initiatives. Examples of cornmon economic institutions may be a 
European patent office, a customs union, the EU internal market, but also more infonnal 
rules and patterned cooperation between European finns on the global market. The 
differentiation between political, economic, or social institutions does not imply that there 
are no links between the sectors'-
It must also be stressed that the concept of 'cornmon institutional arrangements' 
does not necessarily mean that the cornmon framework exhausts the regulation of an 
interaction field. Cornmon institutions may cover some aspects of the field, while subunit 
rule-sets still are active on the national or lower leveL The interplay between cornmon 
institutions and sub-unit institutions may take different fonns, e.g. the cornmon framework 
may give general guide-lines to be filled out in detail by the sub-units - it comes naturally 
here to associate to the ongoing debate about 'subsidiarity' within the European union-
or it may define rules for the extension and validity of the rules of the sub-units, as, for 
example, the EU rule of 'reciprocal recognition' of national product standard testing 
procedures. 
From the perspective of European integration, the concept of integration is related 
to the ongoing political project of integrating the economic and political systems of a 
number of west European countries. The primary instruments used in this political project 
is common decision-making structures (the main parts being the European Council, the 
Council of Ministers, The European Commission, The European Parliament, and the 
European Court of Justice, etc.) producing common rules, regulating the behaviour of 
states, firms, organizations and individuals'. So, the definition of integration in tenns of 
common institutions seems to be a good starting point: we have different sets of 
institutions relating to different action fields, and these have as their aim to regulate, 
organize and coordinate behaviour within their respective action field as defmed by the 
institutional set-up. 
Two things might be gained by explicitly relating the concept of integration to the 
concept of institutions. It is possible to make use of the extensive scientific debate on what 
institutions mean and in what relation they stand to actors and to societal structure and to 
social change. And, secondly, it is possible to highlight or make clear the relation between 
4 
Political actions have, of COl.IfSe, often the economic sector as their target. and strategies within the economic 
lield may be implemented with the purpose of influencing political decisions or changing political power 
relations. 
Sununarized in the term of acquis communautaire. 
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the different aspects of integration, which are common within theories of integration, 
namely (formal) institutions, attitudes, and processes . 
In order to avoid a too static picture, it is important to underline the dynamic 
dimension of integration: institutions change, both as a result of efforts by political and 
economic actors to change the rules, but also as a result of changes in different societal 
sectors . For example: changes in technology, or in science, will lead to changes in 
economic production and the institutional framework will be adapted to, or express, the 
new 'situation'. Raising trade levels will lead to demands for a new, common trade 
regime. Changes in the power relations between social groups, emanating from structural 
changes in the society, such as higher levels of literacy and mobility, will put existing 
institutions under pressure and induce institutional change. 
interaction as Bound by Rules 
There is a plethora of definitions of the concept of institution. According to some one may 
make a distinction between two basic foci of interest in relation to the analysis of 
institutions: a sociological approach emphasizing the "social and cognitive features of 
institutions"' , and a rational-choice approach focussing upon institutions as constraints 
on rational action. In spite of these differences and in spite of the existing view that 
"incommensurable definitions means that despite similarities in labelling, these 
approaches - all called institutionalist - have little in common"6, we find it necessary to 
include elements from these different approaches in our discussion of integration. To us 
there is no way of excluding any of the three concepts being central in the understanding 
of institutions: rules, common understanding (oj a situation), and social relations 
expressed in (regular) interaction pa/terns. In a way, a simple way of approaching the 
place of institutions in social life is to think of them as 'the rules of a social game,7, which 
again are reproduced by the actions of the participants. Different institutionalist 
approaches emphasize somewhat differently the dimensions of institutions. In some 
contexts, institutional frameworks may be seen as constraints on actions, where, in a 
sense, the rules are outside of the actors; in other contexts, institutions are ways of doing 
things, 'habits of the hearts ' (TocqueviIIe) or 'habits of thought' (Veblen), and the rules 
expressed in the interaction patterns are thus 'internalized' in the actors', and they may 
6 
8 
Finnemore. 1996:326. 
lb. p . 326. 
Such an expressl0n is a variation of the definition given by North ·' ... the rules of a game in a society" in 
relation to an institutionalist approach to economics (North, 1991 :3). And in political science March & Olsen 
argue that "/Politicall institutions have a repertoire of procedures, and they use rules to select among them" 
(March & Olsen, 1989:21-22). 
Sometimes the distinction between a 'smaJr and a 'large ' institutionalism is made. 
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even be said to constitute the actors9 
Institutions relate to the members of an interaction field in both these ways'" 
The Definition of an Interaction Field 
Included in 'the rules of the game', or even - it might be said - constituted by them is a 
definition of what kind of game the participants are involved in. Thus, one function of 
institutions is to define an action field, and to create a common understanding of what 
kind of activities which are pursued in that action field, what purpose they have, and what 
values which are being sought and what social relations the participants have. 
Under the heading of rules one may summarize different kind of rules, therein 
included 
* membership rules (who is entitled to participate in the game), 
* role rules (what roles are accessible or legitimate to which participants), 
* action rules (what actions, or set of actions, are permitted, prescribed or prohibited) 
* sanction rules (what sanctions by whom are to follow in relation to the rulegoverned 
behaviour)" . 
* constitutional rules (what procedures to use to change the rules) and so on. 
This is only one way of classifying the rules of a interaction fieldJ2. Others may be more 
relevant in relation to the analysis of specific types of institutions13 . The point to be made 
here is only that an action field is structured through an institution (or a set of institutions) 
and that the institution creates 'meaning' by defining the type or purpose of the interaction 
and creates 'order' by linking role-sets, action-sets, and sanction-sets, including 
incentives, and thereby establishes common expectations of what will probably happen 
in a certain situation, i.e. a certain predictability. The definition of the interaction field 
will also define the interests and the goals of the participants. 
9 
10 
" 
12 
13 
"Participation in the growing network of international organizations is culturally necessary and 'appropriate' 
in James March and Johan Olsen's sense of the tenn. Further, participation in international organizations 
constructs or constitutes what states want or, in the case of European Union participation, what they are" 
(Finnemore, 1996:338). 
Cf p.7 below. 
In spite of the everyday connotation of sanction as negative sanctions, we want to stress that sanction rules 
here may include rewards (positive sanctions) in case of rule-fulfilment as well as punishments (negative 
sanctions) in case of rule breaches. 
UBy 'rules' we mean the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies. organizational fonDS, and 
technologies around which political activity is constructed. We also mean the beliefs, paradigms, codes, 
cultures, and knowledge that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines." (March 
& Olsen, 1989:22). 
Cf Bogason, 1994: 92. 
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Formal Institutions Versus Informal Institutions 
Formal institutions are rule-sets, which are explicitly formulated, often in a written form, 
as in legal regulations, in constitutions, or in organizational charts. Informal institutions 
are rules or rule-sets which are effective in regulating interactions (or transactions) but 
which are not explicitly formulated. The informal rules thus evolves as traditions for 
handling things in a certain wayl., as for example in work norms or norms of cooperation, 
but also manners and social conventions. A specific action field is often regulated by a 
combination of formal and informal rules, where the informal rules supplement and fill 
in the action space created by the formal rules, or - to reverse the sequence - the informal 
rules may be seen as more general cultural norms, which are reflected in the formal 
framework. 
From what has been said so far it may be concluded that organizations, which 
coordinate and regulate the actions and interactions of the members of the organization, 
can be seen as a specific form of institution. An organization is a formally regulated action 
field, which has been established in order to reach some (common) task, goal, or 
purpose IS. The coordination of interaction within an organization takes place through the 
two layers of formal and informal rule-sets, which relate to each other in a more or less 
consistent manner. The informal rules of an organization might be described as the 
organizational culture, or as informal structure, expressed e.g. as informal 'networks'. 
For some analytical purposes - and particularly so where organizations are seen 
as actors - it is of value to make a distinction between institutions and organizations1., and 
look at the institutional framework of the organizations as constraints and organizations 
as "major agents of institutional change"I7. In a way, the distinction can be seen as a 
level-of-analysis distinction, parallel to the distinction between the organization as actor 
and as system. From another point of view, the question whether institutions can be 
conceptualized as actors must be answered by reference to their institutional coherence 
and autonomy. "A claim of coherence is necessary if we wish to treat institutions as 
decision-makers"18. 
The existence and importance of informal institutions, which, though informal, 
create order and reduce uncertainty, is a very fundamental assumption in explanations of 
behaviour regularities, recurring patterns of interactions, and the stability of social life 
such as routines and traditions. 
Institutions, in this very general meaning, is founded on the mental capacities of 
human beings, who can be described as having an intellectual capacity - and the need -
to create a model of the structure of an action field, of different roles and rules and 
14 
15 
16 
" 
" 
In their taxonomy of institutions, relating to innovation systems, Edquist & Johnson (forthcoming) make a 
parallel distinction between designed and self-grovm institutions. 
Cfdiscussion in Halkier, 1996:16-20. 
cr North, 1991 :5 
North, 1991:5. 
March & Olsen, 1989: 17. 
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borders, and who also have the capacity to collectively develop that model, i.e. to change 
it, to make it more realistic, perhaps to make it more differentiated and complex, through 
the interplay with other people - checking out where different perceptions of the (rules 
of) the action field seem to be present and solving the discrepancies between the different 
models, either through adaptation of one's own model or through different kinds of 
coherence-creating 'negotiations' or as an extreme case, through exclusion of the deviant 
actor groups from the action field. 
The common features of such interaction models include at the minimum a 
defrnition of the action field, of its borders, and such restrictions on individual behaviour 
as to allow relatively stable expectations of what is going to happen in the sense that the 
actions of the participants are understandable though perhaps disagreeable. This does not 
imply either that there is or must be total agreement as to the content of roles and rules 
and borders involved in the action field (the game), or that behaviour will, or must be, 
entirely prescribed by the action rules of the institution. By using the analogy of (common 
sense) models of an action field, though developed jointly and/or transmitted to new 
participants, we want to emphasize that there always seem to be some leeway for 
individual interpretation and that the institutional arrangements only create a framework 
for the strategies of the actors. 
The character and degree of convergence and consistency between the action field 
models of the participants is an important and complex research area. Some action fields 
demand a higher level of model convergence, because of specific functional 
requirements, both regarding the tasks of the action field and the necessity for specific, 
in detail prescribed, actions. This would normally be the case for an organization with a 
high level of division of labour, of specialization and complex coordination chains. But 
demands for more strict coordination of behaviour - and thus for more model homogeneity 
- may also be found for reasons of political, religious and social control, thus perpetuating 
a specific structure of power and authority; breaches of ritual and other social rules is 
heavily sanctioned as a way of reinforcing the institutional arrangements and the 
concomitant incentive and ressource distribution bias. 
Institutions and Strategies 
In most circumstances, even including situations with strict action prescriptions, it seems 
reasonable and useful to make a distinction between institutions and strategies. Even if 
an institution contains rules that define the acceptable or legitimate action-set, this action-
set will in most cases include a number of actions - the level of specificityt9 will be less 
than total - and thus there will be room within the institution for strategic deliberations by 
the actors. "Rules and their applicability to particular situations are often ambiguous ... 
Situations can be defined in different ways that call forth different rules. Rules are 
19 One of1he lhree concepts used by Robert O. Keohane 10 describe international institutions. The other two are 
Commonabty - the e,,'lent to which all participants share the sarne institution - and Autonomy - the power of 
the participants to change themselves the rules of the garne. Cf Keohane. 1989:4-5 . 
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constructed by a process that sometimes encourages ambiguity"'o Furthermore, an actor 
may consciously decide to break a rule even if it incurs him internal or external costs. 
And, finally, he may consciously 'choose ' to reinterpret the content of a rule and in that 
way to change it: informal institutions are upheld by the fact that people continue to 
follow them. If they introduce new elements in the interaction pattern, this may eventually 
change the pattern as other participants reinterpret the rule-set and change their behaviour 
accordingly. So, in the case of informal institutions, where there are no specific 
'instillllion guardians' with the power to sanction breaches of action rules and/or 
violations of rule changing procedures, the stability of the institution as an organizing 
device for an action field is only dependent upon the (conscious or unconscious) 
acceptance of the institutional arrangements by the participants of the action field, and this 
acceptance is never unconditional. If conditions change then interaction may change. 
Some changes in the interactional pattern may be contained within the existing institution 
but some may transgress the institutional framework and constitute an institutional 
change. 
By introducing the concept of 'strategy' we have, in a sense, focussed upon 
rational action in a setting of rule-bound behaviour. There is a long-standing scholarly 
discussion about how to explain the existence of rule-bound behaviour. The reason for 
following a certain rule may be expressed either in terms of rationality - the rulebound 
behaviour has long-term beneficial effects, even if it to the individual actor in the short 
run has clear disadvantages - or in terms of needs to follow the rule irrespective of the 
specific outcome, and even if new and apparently better options become available. In this 
perspective "social norms are not future-oriented"21. In many situations it would seem 
that both types of motivational factors are active. "One eclectic view is that some actions 
are rational, others are norm-guided. A more general and more adequate formulation 
would be that actions typically are influenced both by rationality and by nonns"22. 
Rationality may enter when there is a choice between inconsistent or ambiguous rules, or 
it may enter when the rules do not prescribe a specific action but rather create an 
opportunity-set, within which the actors may choose the action leading to the best 
outcome. As we already have discussed above, institutions do not preclude actors from 
having strategies, but these must be included in the deliberations about constraints and 
opportunities. Still, it is not a solution to disregard rules and norms as influencing 
behaviour directly and outside of rational calculation. "Unless rules were considered 
important and were taken seriously and followed, it would make no sense to manipulate 
them for personal benefit. If many people did not believe that rules were legitimate and 
compelling, how could anyone use these rules for personal advantage?"2J. 
20 
21 
March & Olsen, 1989:24. 
EISler, 1989:99. 
Elster, 1989: I 02. 
R. Edgerton, Rules. Exceptions and the Social order, University ofCalifomia Press, 1985 :3, as quoted in 
Elster, 1989: I 03 . 
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Having introduced the distinction between institutions and strategies and the possibility 
of breaking the rules it is now possible for us to single out three aspects of institutions as 
rule-bound interaction, the mixing of which in the debate may create problems of 
understanding and contribute to the impression of the concept as being imprecise. 
1) The first aspect is the introduction o/rules. The rules may be formal and explicit, as 
presented above, or they may be informal and expressed through actions. But the point 
to be made is that new rules may be introduced. This may happen either through political 
decisions or through other authorities. They may also be introduced through changes in 
the behaviour of the participants of the action field, when a new rule may be implied as 
introduced by some actor or group of actors by their change of behaviour (which may also 
be verbally explicated). In order to avoid misunderstanding we say that a rule exists when 
it has been introduced as a rule binding the whole action field, i.e. when somebody 
demands that the rule shall be valid for the action field, or when there emanates a new 
interaction pattern in the field, which 'demands' or implies a change of behaviour by the 
other members of the field. Thus, we don't want to exclude rule-introduction 'behind the 
backs of the actors ' . 
2) The second aspect is the acceptance by the members of the actionjield of the rule as 
binding for the interaction. This is the aspect of the legitimacy of the institution. In the 
case of formal institutions the analytical distinction between the existence of the rule-set 
and its acceptance by the actors seems rather easy to handle. But in the case of informal 
institutions it may seem more difficult to argue for the relevance of this distinction. If 
there is no stable pattern of interaction - the 'evidence' of a common informal institution-
one could argue that there is no common institution but instead several institutions 
regulating different action subfields, or that we are in a position of rapid institutional 
change in a period preceding the establishment of a new common institution and the 
creation of common expectations as to rules and roles and borders of the action-field. 
Still, by introducing the possibility of non-legitimacy of common informal institutions in 
a certain sub-group of the actors of the action field, we may make thinking about the 
dynamics of institutional change easier by not postulating total identity between the 
institution and its acceptance. It becomes easier to reflect upon tensions and conflicts over 
the content of common institutions. 
3) The third aspect is interaction in accordance with the niles. Interaction as rule-bound 
behaviour also implies that institutions are expressed through practices. It is through the 
interactions that the institution is reproduced. 
The behavioural dimension of an institution is necessary in order to single out the 
processes generated under a common institutional rule-set. As already mentioned, 
institutions do not always prescribe a specific behaviour in a specific situation. There is 
always room for maneuvering and the interplay between different strategies may lead to 
outcomes, which are wanted by no one and which come as a surprise to everybody. These 
are the well-known phenomena in social life summarized as the unintended consequences 
12 
of social acl ion". As a variation of this theme, one may see the interplay between the 
formal rules of an organisation and the informal rules of the members of the organization, 
leading to a result far from the (official) goals of the organization. 
4) One might add other aspects of an institution: for example its extension. We have 
earlier talked about a common institution as defining the interaction field or the kind of 
social game to be and the legitimate values to be implemented. Thus, institutions create 
meaning for the participants2s. The institutional arrangement may be defined in terms of 
specific functions and tasks, it may be restricted to a certain group or category of actors, 
it may even include explicit rules for excluding certain groups of actors from entering the 
action field, or for formulating entrance criteria for new-comers, etc. 
Modem life with its highly developed division of labour and specialization, is 
often described in terms of the individual being part of many different social contexts -
social and professional 'games' - with different rationales, different functions, different 
memberships, different degrees of explicit boundedness. Of course, a minimal criterion 
of an interaction field, is that there is some sort of interaction between the members, but 
also some minimal perception of constituting an interaction field. This perception is of 
course related to the 'model' of the social context, to which we have referred earlier (p. 
3). The interaction field could be defined very much in terms of its specific functions and 
be of an ad hoc-character, as for a team of engineers put together as a network in order 
to solve a specific technical problem. It may be very task oriented but of a more 
permanent character, as in a research and development branch of a commercial firm. But 
one may also defme an interaction field, where the level of interaction perhaps is more 
potential than real, or maybe with a better expression, more indirect than direct and 
interpersonal, but where there is a common definition of belonging together, of having a 
common identity. The example which immediately comes to one's mind is the 'nation'. 
In the classical formulation of Benedict Andersen the nation is an "imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,,26 . It is referred to 
as imagined, because it is not based upon an actual experience that the members share 
some common characteristics and some common identity. "Even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them'm. But these 
characteristics - for example a common culture and a common history - are imagined as 
real and existing. Furthermore, the nation is limited, i.e. the boundaries of the interaction 
24 
" 
'6 
" 
Cf for example, Raymond Boudon, The Unintended Consequences of Sociol Action, The Macmillan Press, 
London, 1982. 
"Politics creates, confirms, or modifies interpretations oflife. Through politics, individuals deVelop their 
identities, their communities, and the public good. Historically, theories of political institutions portrayed 
political decision making primarily as a process for developing a sense of purpose. direction and, belonging" 
(March & Olsen, 1989:48). An analogue argument could, of course, be ex1ended to economic or social 
institutions. 
Andersen, 1991 :6. 
Andersen. 1991 :6 . 
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field, is (imagined to be) fairly well defined. As a political community it is conceived as 
consisting of individuals who are equal, i.e. of citizens with equal rights and duties, quite 
irrespective of real inequalities of political opportunities and influence. Thus, the nation 
constitutes an interaction field in the sense that it is structured by common institutions, 
defining common goals and meanings, even in the case when there are no formal 
institutional arrangements like a state. 
There is no difficulty in multiplying examples of different types of interaction 
fields with the use of dimensions such as single-PllI1lose - multi-purpose interaction, 
degree of organizational (formal) structure, degree of permanence, degree of specificity, 
degree of commonality, or degree of rule softness-hardness'8. The notions of 'interaction 
field' and of 'institution', in spite of being vague, and with some difficulties in the 
empirical assessment of where the borders of an interaction field are situated29, point to 
the element of rule-bound behaviour. 
Two reflections seem pertinent here: 
1) Different rule-sets regulate different social contexts. An individual switching from one 
context to another has normally the capacity to identify the change in context and to 
identify and use the relevant rule-set in his dealings with the other players of that 
particular 'social game'. Thus, difficulties in delimiting institutions and interaction 
fields by the analyst may be Tllore a question of ignorance and lack of learning (through 
observation or participation) in specific social contexts than an inherent fuzziness of 
the concept. 
2) The question if and how different institutional arrangements refer to each other 
becomes central here. It seems evident that if the different institutions of a society have 
some common characteristics, if the rules - action-rules, procedure-change-rules and 
sanction-rules etc. - of different societal institutions can be said to resemble each other, 
to express common elements or to be specific and context-bound formulations of more 
general rules or norms, then the whole collective construction of institutions for 
different interaction fields seem somewhat less prohibitive as a social learning process. 
If one accepts the idea of higher level norms and rules there will be certain restrictions 
on what kind of rules in a specific interaction fields which will be probable and 
acceptable. Among the participants of a new interaction field there will already exist 
common expectations as to what rules to accept and what rules to expect. This will of 
course make the learning and adaptation to a new situation much easier, one might even 
- at least hypothetically - conceive of a process when a group of actors who have not 
been acting together before, but having the same general norms, can - without 
interaction and without checking up with each other - deduce a set of 'reasonable' rules 
for a common institution and be fairly confident that their different institutional 
The harder a rule , the more binding or non-optional. 
In this they, seem parallel to other social science concepts like 'system ' and 'network ' . handy for thought but 
with uncertain empirical borders. 
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alTangements will resemble each other. The time and energy needed to settle 
misunderstandings and conflicts will in that case be drastically reduced. 
Whether, or to what extent, such more general normsJO (and values) in the form of a 
societal culture exist is a highly contested issue. Depending upon the interests of the 
researcher the complexity31 of cultural phenomena may allow you to focus upon the 
general and common aspects of a culture or on the diversity of cultural expressions. From 
the perspective presented here the question is not so much whether there are any general 
norms, which create a framework for interpreting rule-sets and restrain the set of 
acceptable or preferable rules of different institutional arrangements, but rather whether 
we should talk about transnational sectoral or professional cultures instead of national or 
societal cultures. This is related to the question of the organization and control of the 
socializing and learning processes of modem societies. Through those - and through 
interaction experience - different actor groups generate the collective 'models' which are 
the basis of their common expectations and rule-development. 
Stability and Change of Institutions 
Implicit in the concept of 'institution' is stability, or recurring patterns of actions. 
"Continuously changing institutions are, after, all, a contradiction in terms,m And 
institutional change, if reflected upon at all, is often thought of as long-term and slow. 
This is particularly so in the case of macro-societal institutions, like the family or basic 
authority rules in a society. 
But institutions do change, new institutions are introduced and come to regulate 
interactions within a field - a new constitution may restructure political life, or new basic 
economic institutions will regulate new economic transactions (as we see it in transition 
economies), new transnational cooperation patterns are developing within the framework 
of all European institutions, etc. This seerns unavoidable, if a social, economic or political 
system is to adapt to, for example, changes in technology, demography, and in the 
international environment. Thus, institutions must be approached both from the 
perspective of stability and from the perspective of change. Let us first discuss some 
mechanisms contributing to the stability of institutions. 
]I 
32 
One of the most famous and most often cited analyses of broad national cultural nonns is Gert Hofstedes 
Cultures and organizations. Software of the mind, 1991. He deduces four general cultural dimensions from 
his analysis of the survey responses of IBM employees in a series of countries: power distance, individua 
tismlcollectivism. masculinitylfernininity, uncertainty avoidance. 
Cf. Cultural Complexity by Uif Hannerz. in which the emphasis is on the diversity of cultural phenomena. 
related to different societal sectors. and to the diversity of local traditions. 
Edquist & Johnson, (forthcoming) p. 22 . 
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Institutional stability 
If institutions are described as rule-sets defining a certain action-field or what has been 
called a 'social game' it is fairly easy to imagine different mechanisms, which may 
contribute to the maintenance of the institution. We have already mentioned the inclusion 
of sanction-rules - which defme what kind of sanctions which may be implemented by 
whom to actors who break the rules - and we have also introduced the term of 'institution 
guardians', who act in order to secure the continuation of the institution. The guardians 
can be fonnal organizations, which have the specific responsibility to investigate and 
intervene where formal or legal rules have been broken, one may give the example of the 
European Commission as the 'Guardian of the Treaties', but, of course, police and courts 
of justice are just as good, trivial examples from the national arena, having the 
responsibility of rule-enforcement. But within the context of infonnal institutions - and 
even for many fonnal institutions - the identification of the institution guardians is 
somewhat less self-evident. Two main groups of mechanisms might be singled out, and 
summarized in the terms of 'social control' and 'internalization of social or cultural 
norms'. The idea of 'social control' points to existence of many different forms of action 
patterns, utilized by the members of a particular action field, in order to convince 
potentially recalcitrant participants in a social game that it will be to their advantage to 
follow the rules and not to break them. The resources used may also be vastly different 
(from threats of withdrawal of economic or social opportunities, to threats of 
psychological deprivation such as withdrawal of security, love or other emotional links) 
depending upon what kind of institutionally structured action field we focus upon and 
what kind of participant relations which characterize that field. 'Internalization' suggests 
mechanisms through which the participant actor come to accept the institutional rule-sets 
as natural, suitable or given, to the extent that he has no internal incentive to try to change 
the rules or strongly feel tempted to break them. The reasons for the internalization of 
social rules can be sought both within a theoretical framework of social and psychological 
needs - our social character - which make the acceptance of collective norms a part of the 
human condition, and within a theoretical framework of utilitarian deliberation, where the 
actors realize the necessity to create some interaction structure and stay by the rules, in 
order to avoid the costs of non-coordination, be they described as anarchy, as prohibitive 
uncertainty or as high transaction costs. The rationality of institutions, in terms of over-aIl 
cost reduction, seems to be a rather prominent theme within institutionalist approaches in 
political science and - of course - in economics, even if institutions are seen as 'biased', 
i.e. distributing gains and costs in an unequal manner between the participating groups of 
actors. It is not necessary, nor possible, to expand here the discussion of different 
traditions for explaining rule-bound behaviour, but the question raised is relevant to the 
problem which is crucial to our investigation of institutional conflict and institutional 
change, or rephrased, of institutional stability: Why stick to a specific institutional 
arrangement? Or, what are the motivating force to oppose or resist the introduction of new 
institutional arrangements, such as all-European political and economic institutions? 
Some different answers to the question of why one sticks to an institution may be 
singled out as examples : 
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One might value the participation in the action field, defined by a specific 
institution, in tenus of self-identification and self-realization. In a new 
institutional context your identity may be changed and in a direction yet 
unknown. 
One might also value the continued existence of the institution, because it creates 
meaningfulness and cognitive order, and in that way reduces anxiety. A new 
institutional set-up may demand comprehensive redefinition of the action field 
and may also introduce uncertainty and cognitive disorder. 
One might value the power position allocated by the existing institution. 
Institutional change may reshuffie the distribution of economic or political power 
resources. 
One might value the output of the action field, the gains to be realized through the 
coordination of action, which might be jeopardized by a new institutional set-up, 
both through the reshuffling of the distribution of material gains and through the 
disruption of a smoothly running of an ongoing system and, thus, leading to 
raising transaction costs. Institutional change takes time to be implemented, new 
tensions may be introduced quite apart from the costs incurred by the introduction 
of new routines and new standards. 
Insliluliona/ change 
In spite of the traditional emphasis on the stability of institutions, it is as important to 
include the perspective of institutional change. This may be conceptualized as the 
introduction of a new institutional set-up as an adaptation to a new situation: tensions 
build up as a result of the institutional 'sclerosis'33, i.e. mal-functioning of the earlier 
institutional set-up, which eventually is substituted by a more appropriate one. Different 
sectors of a society develop in different ways or at different speeds. The inter-connections 
between the spheres mean that the rigidity of one sphere comes to constitute an obstacle 
to further developments in other sectors. One classic example of this way of reasoning is 
the Marxist conceptual differentiation between the productive forces and the production 
relations of a society. But the basic argument can be found in modern theories of 
economic growth. Chris Freeman distinguishes between five societal subsystems, with 
each their relative autonomy and different patterns of institutional stability and change: 
the technological, the scientific, the economic, the political and the general cultural 
subsystem. Economic growth will depend upon the institutional fit between these. 
"Positive congruence and interaction between them provides the most fertile soil for 
growth, while lack of congruence may prevent growth altogether, or slow it down"3 •. 
But institutional change may also be of a less dramatic character. Institutions may 
change through piece-meal engineering, where new rules and new roles are introduced 
)3 
)4 
'Ewu-sclerosis' was a common designation in the 1970's of the incapacity of the EC system to change in face 
of changing world economic relations. 
Freeman, 1995 :ii . 
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into the set-up, without disrupting the rest of the rule-set. This way of developing 
institutions is based upon the assumption that it is possible to introduce new elements, 
which fit into or complement the existing rule-structure. The introduction of an 
'ombudsman' , which would fit nicely into an open, democratic political system, will 
create tensions and even disruptions in an oligarchic political institutional set-up. 
Changes in infOImal institutional rules may also create the flexibility needed for the new 
circumstances, without any changes in the formal rule-set. Changes in political party 
cooperation and alliance possibilities, which can be described as against the political 
traditions of a country, may be implemented to reduce political unrest or demand 
overload, without any change neither in the constitution nor in the internal formal rules 
of the parties. 
Implicit in the idea of small-scale institutional adaptation is often a distinction 
between more basic or fundamental institutions and more restricted rule-sets35, applied 
in a certain area. The latter are, in a sense, less important and more changeable, as long 
as the introduction of new rules does not conflict with the basic rules of a society. In this 
context, one might also draw attention to the possible existence of rules, which establishes 
procedures for the change of institutions, something which makes rule-change part of the 
ongoing interaction patterns: institutional change becomes part of institutional stability. 
The rule-making and rule-changing capacity of the political system is of course the prime 
example, but the existence of rule-changing rules are probably ubiquitous. 
institutional Conflict 
It is important to stress that institutional change often is imbedded in conflicts about the 
what institutional arrangements to introduce (and perhaps also about the most appropriate 
procedures for deciding upon and implementing new rules.) We have already mentioned 
that the introduction of new institutions may take place as a result of a deliberate effort 
to establish a new institutional arrangement by purposive action as for example in 
negotiations leading to the decision and ratification of a new political constitution, or the 
establishment of a new organization, or the decisions on a political-economic project such 
as the regulations comprising an internal market. We have also said that new institutions 
may also - in the case of informal institutions - emanate as a result of the reciprocal 
adaptation of behaviour (and the corresponding understanding of the interaction field) 
after 'malfunctioning' of an old institution at least in the view of some of the actors of the 
interaction field, leading to initiatives to change interaction patterns. 
Institutional conflict can take a variety of forms but will always consist of a 
rivalry about which rule-set that should be valid. In the case of non-formalized 
institutions, different groups may compete through their actions as to what institutional 
arrangement should regulate behaviour within the interaction field. The rivalry may also 
be expressed in different claims as to the defmition of the interaction field or 'what kind 
of social game we are to play' . In the absence of direct communication and negotiation 
opportunities, the introduction of new rules and attempts to redefme the game will most 
'Supportive institutions' in the tenninology of Edquist & Johnson (forthcoming) p. IS . 
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probably incur large costs, in the fonn of misunderstandings, confusion, disruption of 
routines and traditional ways of doing things, and furthermore, in the attempt by other 
participants in the interaction field to retaliate, and perhaps to try to exclude the 
'institution revisionists ' from the interaction field. The case of interaction without any 
communication and the transfer of intentions and the will to change rules may seem far-
fetched . Still, the establishment of an international system of states based upon the 
concept of state sovereignty and the principle of legal equality of all states, seems to be 
an example where rules and common understanding were developed to a large extent as 
a result of direct political or military interaction with direct communication playing a 
minor role36. 
In the case of formalized institutions the conflict may take the form of a) direct 
(political or social) opposition to the institutional arrangements, i.e. an effort to change 
the formal rule decisions, or b) indirect or informal opposition, where the leeway for 
individual strategies" to pursue the establishment or maintenance of an alternative rule-set 
is exploited. This could take the form of informal institutional structure among a sub-set 
of the participants, building informal roles, routines, standardized operations and pursuing 
values which are not part of the formal institution but doing so without entering into open 
conflict with the fonnal institutional arrangements and without risking sanctions from the 
'institution guardians' . 
Another conflict strategy in the case of institutional conflicts is to withdraw from 
the interaction field - to use the exit-option - and to try to build an institution of one's own 
and try to isolate it from the earlier interaction field. You might create an organization of 
your own with its own rules, e.g. a state, a church, a local community, a school, based 
upon other principles than the surrounding environment. Or, if there already exist 
alternative institutional arrangements for a certain interaction type in a society, the 
individual solution to the conflict will be to opt out of one social game and just join 
another. In a political context, you may for example 'vote with your feet', in economics 
you may change to another job in another firm, another producer, etc. 
Thus, the form the institutional conflict will take, will be dependent upon whether 
there is - or may be established - institutional pluralism. Now, the characteristics of the 
interaction field, including whether the tasks or functions of the interaction field are 
dependent upon a high level of division of labour, of precise coordination between 
different actions in specific sequences, and so on, may make the existence of different 
rule-sets detrimental to the interaction goals, be they expressed in tenns of a certain output 
or in terms of 'efficiency'. It is difficult to imagine a centralized bureaucratic organization 
accepting different competing decision-making centers or competing lines-of-command. 
On the other hand, different organizations, using different institutional arrangements, may 
co-exist in a certain interaction field, if they are connected in an orderly or routinized way 
to each other through 'higher level' rules. Such higher-level rules may reduce the (risk for) 
conflict or intrusion of one organization by another by restricting the forms of contacts, 
)6 C[ DWlIle 1995. passihl. 
C[ p. 5 above. 
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i.e. by regulating the competition between the organizations. Thus, by introducing 
common higher level rules , which establish the principle of non-intervention and 
autonomy for member-groups of the interaction-field, the stage is set for a combination 
for common, higher level, institutions, and different, lower level, institutions, a necessary 
structural element in order to handle institutional diversity in a modem society. 
In many cases different member groups with different institutions do not have the 
option of autonomy or isolation in relation to other groups. They may be connected to 
each other as competitors for scarce resources, for control over the environment, for 
influence over higher level decisions, which will have an impact on them all, etc. In such 
cases, there is a possibility that conflicts over the common institutional framework will 
reemerge, as every institutional framework distributes opportunities and incentives in a 
way which may be contested. 
Conceptual Dimensions of 'Integration' 
Using the discussions and the distinctions made above, we may now elaborate on different 
dimensions of the concept of 'integration' . Let us therefore present four different aspects 
of the concept of integration, which may be the focus of interest and denote different 
concepts of integration: 
Integration as policy 
On the one hand, 'integration' denotes the establishment of common, in the sense of 
formal, legally binding, rules for a certain interaction area. Thus, integration is seen as a 
public policy with the intention to regulate the interaction of a certain interaction field. 
The policy of linking together of earlier separate and different action fields within 
a common institutional set-up is of course based upon the idea that integration is 
advantageous compared to having different institutions covering only the interaction 
system of a restricted area such as one conntry. In relation to the ongoing European 
integration project there is a continuing political debate about the distribution of 
advantages and disadvantages as a result of the integration for the participating countries, 
regions, economic sectors, social groups, etc. In an integration process based upon the 
principle of voluntary acceptance, quite clearly the overall advantage of all the 
participating units, be it in terms of economic growth or political strength or security, 
must of course be presented as self-evident and guaranteed. Otherwise, voluntarily 
accepted integration would be impossible. 
Perhaps we may be allowed to digress here and note that it is quite possible to 
elaborate an idea of 'integration as policy', which is not based upon the voluntary accept 
by the participating political units, but where the common institutions are established as 
legally binding rules by a hegemonic political power, which has the ambition and the 
capacity to legally enforce the institutional arrangements, in spite of opposition and 
resistance of the other. Examples of forced integration 'as policy' may be the 
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establishment of an empire or the establishment of a non-democratic political union, 
dominated by one country. 
It is the aim of the integration policy, which is the focal point of this integration 
aspect and not whether the aim is realized or not or what kind of effects or impact that the 
policy has. This is a common way of using the integration-term as when we for example 
talk about the internal market programme as a 'new step' in European integration. It is the 
almost 300 common rules of the programme which we refer to, quite irrespective of 
whether these rules have the intermediate result of establishing free movement of goods, 
services, labour, and capital. Quite clearly, there is an assumption that legally binding 
rules are obeyed and that the common rule-set also will regulate the interactions of the 
area. But this of course in many cases an unfounded assumption. Integration in the sense 
of new and intended interaction patterns might moderated or hampered by the two other 
dimensions of institutional arrangements, the attitudinal dimension and the behavioural 
or interaction dimension. 
The first concerns the acceptance of the participants of the interaction field of the 
new rules. If there is an obstruction of these, the interaction will not be regulated as 
intended. Actors may continue to follow old routines instead of exploiting new 
opportunities given by the introduction of new rules, or they may try to avoid following 
the new rules, even if these prescribe a certain line of action, and so on. Fraud, sabotage, 
tax avoidance are all examples of intentional rule-breaking, implying a level of non-
acceptance of rules", which highlight the distinction between integration as the 
introduction of new rules and integration as the acceptance of those common rules. 
The second dimension of institutional failure, the behavioural or interactional 
dimension, focuses upon another reason for the gap between aims and outcome. The 
policy-makers, aiming at integrated interaction patterns, have as all policy-makers 
incomplete knowledge of what aggregate impact the introduction of the new rules will 
have. New action patterns emerge, unforeseen by them, and perhaps by everybody else, 
the complexity of coordination oflarge numbers of actions, together with the uncertainty 
of how actors will react - what line of action they will take - in a new situation, defies all 
calculi. The result will be 'the unintended consequences of social action' . Thus, 
integration aims may create disintegration as result, because of the policy-makers' limited 
control over the interaction field. 
The distinction between integration as policy and integration as (change in) 
interaction patterns, is of course parallel to the traditional distinction between policy as 
output of a decision-making process, and policy as outcome, i.e. the changes implemented 
on a societal arena. It is commonplace to note I) that results often differ from aims in 
political policy-making, and 2) that it is surprisingly common that policy-makers often 
show a very moderate or non-existing interest in fmding out what specific impact a 
particular policy has had. Explanations for this reluctance could be founded in a logic of 
political leadership: the lack of interest by political decision-makers is due to their need 
to be able to present themselves as strong and efficient leaders, who have control over 'the 
)8 We do not wish to enter a moral-philosophical discussion about whether an actor may accept rules as 
legitimate while omitting to obey them in a specific situation. 
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situation', and to whom every disclosure of policy failure or inefficiency means a 
weakening of their political position. A variation of this kind of political-logic-explanation 
focuses on the 'real' fimction of the political process to create an image of orderliness and 
control over societal developments more than a specific outcome in terms of distribution 
or redistribution of certain valuesJ9• 
Integration as political ideology 
In the same way one could see the initiatives taken the last 40 years in relation to 
European integration, as a political project, or even as a political ideology40, the function 
of which is to create a political concept which defines a new political and economic order 
and which points to the establishment of common institutions as a way to make sure that 
there exists a rational way of surmounting the present unsatisfactory situation - or even 
crisis if one prefers that term. This kind of comprehensive plan or strategy for a societal 
reconstruction - which in a way could be seen almost as comprehensive as the 'traditional' 
ideologies of liberalism or socialism41 - assures through the emphasis on common 
institutions that "choice lean bel ... made intelligently, .. . that lit! is sensitive to the concerns 
of relevant people, and ..... that the political system is controlled by its leadership,,42. 
Integration as political ideology as based upon the idea that common institutions 
solve a lot of the problems facing modem European societies. In a way, coordination and 
cooperation through common institutions, both in the political and the economic spheres, 
become the central organising principles, which create a necessary positive dynamics, 
generating growth and trust for the whole integrated system. Thus, the ideology 
emphasizes (legal) rule integration as an instrument not only for dismantling barriers but 
positively for creating a harmonious social development, where equal opportunities will 
strengthen understanding, trust and cooperation. Fundamentally, it seems to be a version 
of societal model based upon a conception of consensus, i.e. mental distance and social 
conflicts tends to diminish as a result of the establishment of common institutions. 
The ideology may seem to be founded on two presuppositions. One is that behind 
the diversity of nation-states and the political barriers between peoples, there is a certain 
level of commonness or unity between the peoples. Therefore peaceful cooperation and 
non-discrimination is possible and needed. The second presupposition is that 
interdependence through technological and communicational developments has grown to 
)9 
40 
4\ 
Cf. March & Olsen, I 989 :chapter 3. 
It is quite illuminating that in M.A. Riff (ed.) 'Dictionary ofModero political ideologies ' , pp. 86-89 there 
is a short chapter on European integration, wri tten by Peter Ludlow. 
Integration as an ideology can be seen both as a general or global ideology, emphasizing the need for global 
institutions. and as a regional ideology, emphasizing only regional - in our case European - common 
institutions. In the latter case it is of course less comprehensive than ideologies with Wliversal aspirations 
such as liberalism or socialism. 
March & Olsen, 1989:50. 
22 
• 
the extent that only common institutions can minimize the ensuing potential for conflict 
and reap the economic, social and political benefits of large-scale cooperative efforts. 
Within these broad ideological principles very many different, more specific, 
plans for common institutional arrangements, can be - and have been - proposed. The 
ongoing political debates on federalism, confederalism, supernationalism and intergovem-
mentalism, economic and monetary union, can all be seen as expressing different blue-
prints for European integration based upon the broad political ideology of European 
integration. 
Integration as process 
The third aspect of institutions, mentioned above, is the interactional dimension. Common 
institutions regulate interactions. New institutional rules, introduced by integrationist 
policies, may change the interaction patterns in ways, which can be summarized in terms 
of integration. If people act according to common rules they are integrated, and, in a 
certain sense, they are integrated by the common institutional arrangements. People are 
integrated socially, if they define the social situation in the same way and if they follow 
the same rules in the same way. Political integration means that people accept and act in 
accordance with common political institutions, in the same way as 'economic integration' 
stands for activities regulated by common economic institutions. 
On the other hand, there is no immediate or automatic correspondence between 
the introduction of common legal rules for a certain interaction field and the ensuing 
interaction patterns. As we have argued above, there are different mechanisms in relation 
rule-based behaviour, which make it natural to assume a less than total fit between the 
formal definition and rules and the interactions. 
- Formal rules may permit behaviour rather than prescribe it. It is not certain that the 
opportunities created by the new rules will be exploited by the participants of the 'field' 
in question. For example, the opportunity to compete on equal terms on a market, may 
not be enough incentive for a firm to enter the market. In many cases, the formal 
opportunity must be supplemented by economic support incentives, if action patterns 
are going to change. 
- Formal rules may be vague as to what they prescribe or as to when, i.e. in what type 
of situation, they apply. This feature of rules - unavoidable if the application of a 
general rule is linked to some complex characteristics of the situation - opens up for 
different interpretations of what the legitimate behaviour should be and, thus, for 
different actions leading to an interaction field with misunderstandings, lack of 
coordination and 'inefficiency' . 
- Actors may try to avoid acting in accordance with the new common rules and try to 
stick to their old ways of doing things. They may dislike the new common institutional 
arrangements, and, for political reasons, try to oppose them with the aim to change 
them either in a formal way by forcing the decision-makers to adapt the rules to the 
existing practices, or in informal way by establishing or maintaining practices which 
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make the rules obsolete. 
- Actors may be ignorant of the new common, legal rules . If the capacity of the common 
institution to sanction is limited, this might create a situation where different and 
inconsistent rules apply to the same social game for quite a long time. The interaction 
field is less integrated or not integrated at all. 
All in all, one might easily envisage a situation, where there is a certain level of 
inconsistency as to what rules apply, what importance to attach to the different rules, and 
what reasonable or legitimate actions which follow from the rules. A certain 'slack' is 
natural and unavoidable, if one wants to preserve flexibility and be able to adapt to new 
situations and to changes in the environment. Another reason for slack, the potential for 
• strategic exploitation of rule ambiguity by individual actors, is also unavoidable in our 
civilization. On the other hand, and to repeat, common institutions fulfill certain 
functions, which could be seen as common goods to all of the participants, they create 
order and reduce uncertainty, they reduce negotiation and adaptation costs through the 
establishment of known procedures and routines, they make coordination and the 
implementation of common, complex tasks possible, etc. Thus, there seem to be strong 
forces also working in the direction of growing correspondence between the rules of a 
common institution and the acceptance of them expressed in behaviour patterns. In many, 
but not all, circumstances we would expect over time a growing acceptance of a common 
institution, and adaptation of actor behaviour to the formal rules - and the more so the 
more comprehensive and efficient their regulation of the interaction field seems to be. The 
reasons for this assumption is the 'irrationality' or costliness of not using the advantages 
of participating in the social game, when the chances of changing the 'rules of the game' 
are negligible, and the common interests of all participants of participating in an 
interaction field characterized by order instead of chaos. Integration may thus seem as a 
process over time, with a growing acceptance of the institutional set-up and a growing 
definition of actor interests and strategies in accordance with its definition of the 
interaction field'3. One may here draw attention to a parallel between this argument and 
the idea of rational norms, in the sense that the establishment of some norms seem less 
costly than uncertainty and chaos. But our argument does not imply that specific 
institutional set-ups are rational or optimal. They are much more the products of historical 
development and of different power constellations. 
It is important to underline that all the time there is in the interaction field a 
tension between integrating and disintegrating tendencies. The disintegrating tendencies 
emanate from the internal dynamics of an institutional set-up, referred to above, both 
expressed in the incomplete regulation by the institutional rules of an interaction field, and 
in the incomplete correspondence between actor strategies and rules. But they also 
emanate from the need to change the rules when the situation changes. The perceived kind 
TIlls way of fonnulating the tendency over time to further integration. may seem to bave a certain similarity 
to, particularly, neo-functional integration theories, and, of cow-se, there is a parallel in relation to the gradual 
""""Ptance of new institutions to the degree that they constitute an important given fact of the new interaction 
field . But we h.ve not included any kind of expansion.1 logic of'spiU-over' to the establishment of new 
regulato ry regimes. 
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of regulation needed for an interaction field may change as societal problems and 
proposed solutions change over time, be they economic problems such as recession or 
unemployment or political problems in terms of political instability, the rise of political 
violence, or lack oflegitimacy of the political system. Societal ideologies may change and 
new proposals for new institutional arrangements are brought into the economic and 
political discourse, criticizing the present institutions as inefficient or unjust. The 
integration processes may thus be seen as open-ended, coexisting with disintegrating 
processes, where there happens a division, a split up, of an interaction field into different 
subfields, defined by different institutions. The interplay between integration and 
disintegration processes is very complex. New patterns of interaction, be they formal or 
informal, are generated all the time, while some common institutions remain and regulate 
the characteristics of and 1inks between the new organized interaction fields. Higher level 
rules or norms will regulate the institutions on a lower level. Thus, political rules often 
regulate the autonomy of an organization to restrict the access to that organization, in 
order to prohibit discriminatory practices. Higher level cultural norms will regulate 
acceptable links between individuals and (public) organizations expressed in client, 
customer or citizen roles. 
Integration as social learning 
Institutions as rule-sets include one other aspect which we have so far only touched upon 
very fleetingly, but which has been implicitly present in the emphasis on institutions as 
common or collective rules: they have to be learnt. The institutions of a society, being 
common to all participants of an interaction field, must be transmitted to the members, 
and accepted by them, for the institutional arrangement to fulfill the function of 
coordinating behaviour. A new participant in a social game must learn the rules of the 
game. What kind of game it is, who is entitled to participate, what actions are permitted 
or prescribed in different situations, what sanctions which are related to what breaches of 
the rules, all this must be learnt, and to some extent, be taught, to new participants. Many 
of the basic institutions of a society are initially taught through the educational system. 
In many school-systems you are taught the basics about the political system, its 
constitution, main institutions and procedures, while both understanding and basic values 
are developed through interaction with your peer-groups, through mass-media etc. Some 
more task-specific rule-sets, such as the rules of a bureaucracy, are learnt through a 
combination of teaching of official organization charts and job descriptions, and training. 
Some informal institutions, such as the informal cultural rules of the social life of a local 
commlIDity, must be almost entirely learnt through imitation and experience, as they are 
rarely explicitly formulated. It is important to stress that institutions are learnt through 
social interaction in the sense that the 'mental models ' ... of roles, rules and borders of a 
social field are developed through the interplay with other people, where a) the history of 
the action field, b) individual experience of what rules which actually regulate behaviour, 
.. Cf. p. 6 above. 
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and c) the influence of other people in communicating the 'rules of the action field', all 
have a significant part to play. Thus, knowledge, beliefs, and ideas about an institution are 
'socially constructed'. As the rules of the action field are reproduced by the actions of the 
participants, the rule-set is possible to change, but only through social action, not 
individual. A sudden change in the action repertoire of one participant will most probably 
create uncertainty and suspicion and possibly resistance and sanctions from the other 
participants. In cases of hegemony or extreme power inequality, one might of course fmd 
an individual actor whose actions can be decisive in the social construction of an 
institution, in the sense that he can 'force' the other actors to adopt new rules for the field 
despite their reluctance to do so. 'Social construction ' does not imply equality of 
influence. 
It seems evident that, as we defme integration as the establishment of common 
institutions for a certain interaction field, these institutional rule-sets will be learnt, 
internalized and accepted through processes which may be summarized as 'social 
learning' or the 'social construction' of an interaction field. 
Thus, integration as socialleaming might be seen as a process through which the 
actors develop their knowledge and adjust their expectations of what actions and roles 
which are appropriate in the new, formally integrated, interaction field. As we have 
already discussed above, the introduction of new cornmon institutions is sometimes a 
politically contested issue. This means that the social learning processes may reflect a 
power distribution in society. Social learning is not 'neutral' in relation to the values and 
interests of the participants and therefore strategies to influence and control the processes 
are to be expected. But through social learning people corne to be integrated in the sense 
that they corne to share beliefs and norms about an interaction field. 
Social learning can also be seen as continuous process, where there is not only 
a learning in relation to the introduced institutions, but where the interaction patterns, 
established by the new institutional framework, support the generation of new experiences 
and new knowledge. The interaction field can thus be seen as knowledge-producing field, 
with new knowledge or innovations being the result of the present institutional set-up, but 
also potentially challenging that set-up and generating proposals for institutional change. 
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